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Abstract 
MOLECULAR EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MRSA AMONG PATIENTS AND EMPLOYEES IN A 
SURGICAL INTENSIVE CARE UNIT 
by 
Kerri Augustino 
August, 2011 
Director: Dr. Keith Ramsey 
Department of Biology 
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is a pervasive drug resistant human 
pathogen and has become widespread in hospitals around the world.  MRSA infections cause 
approximately 19,000 deaths among hospitalized Americans annually.  It is one of the leading 
causes of healthcare associated, or nosocomial infections, particularly in intensive care units. 
Hospital acquired MRSA (HA-MRSA) has been a battle for inpatients since the 1960’s. 
However, in the late 1990’s, a new strain of MRSA emerged.  It appeared outside of the hospital 
setting and has been termed, community associated MRSA (CA-MRSA).  Presently, CA-MRSA 
has been found to be spreading into the healthcare system presenting a new obstacle for patients 
and hospitals to overcome.  
It has been suggested that employees play a role in transmission of MRSA to hospitalized 
patients.  Since healthcare workers are at the interface between hospitals and the community, 
they may serve as a potential reservoir for spreading MRSA.  However, there are a limited 
   
number of studies that investigate employee MRSA colonization and subsequent transmission to 
patients.  
This study seeks to provide molecular evidence supporting the likelihood that employees 
play a role in MRSA transmission to patients.  Furthermore, with the implementation of a 
version of “search and destroy”, an infection control strategy, we show how reductions of 
hospital-acquired infections are achieved using this method. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Staphylococcus aureus (S. aureus) has been recognized as an important cause of disease 
around the world.  It has become a major pathogen associated with both hospital- and 
community-acquired infections.  One strain in particular, an antibiotic resistant strain termed 
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), is one of the leading causes of healthcare 
associated, or nosocomial bacterial infections representing 64% of the S. aureus isolates detected 
in hospital intensive care units (National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance Report, 2004). 
MRSA has become widespread in hospitals worldwide and is responsible for causing bacteremia, 
pneumonia, surgical site infections, and other nosocomial infections.  MRSA infections cause 
approximately 19,000 deaths among hospitalized Americans annually, which are higher than the 
number of deaths due to AIDS, tuberculosis, and viral hepatitis combined (Boucher and Corey, 
2008).  Klein and colleagues reported an increase of 119% of MRSA related hospitalization 
between the years of 1999-2005, or a 14% increase per year, with an estimate of 278,000 
hospitalizations (Klein et al., 2007).  Clearly there is a burden placed on the patient, but one also 
exists for hospitals and healthcare systems.  It is estimated that the mean cost attributable to an 
MRSA infection is approximately $35,000 each (Stone, 2002), and the annual cost to treat 
MRSA in hospitalized patients in the U.S. to be between $3.2 billion to $4.2 billion (Rojas, 
2005). 
However, there are some shifts in the trends.  Recent estimates indicate a stabilization 
trend with only 56% of device-associated infections due to MRSA from 2006-2007 (Hidron et 
al., 2008).  Moreover, the incidence of MRSA central line-associated bloodstream infections 
reported from hundreds of ICU’s has decreased 50-70% between 2001 and 2007 (Burton et al., 
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2009).  Kallen and colleagues also demonstrated a 34% decrease in blood stream infections from 
all types of hospitalizations between 2005 and 2008 (Kallen et al., 2010). 
History 
S. aureus was identified as a causative agent in disease as early as the 1880s.  Prior to the 
availability of antibiotics, the mortality rate of an individual with an invasive S. aureus infection 
was about 80% (Skinner and Keefer, 1941).  With the introduction of penicillin in the early 
1940s, the prognosis for patients with severe infections greatly improved.  However, after two 
years of clinical use, penicillin-resistant S. aureus isolates began to appear (Kirby, 1944).  By 
1950, 40% of hospital S. aureus isolates were penicillin-resistant and that percentage grew to 
80% by 1960 (Chambers, 2001).  In 1959, methicillin, a penicillinase resistant β-lactam, was 
developed by the United Kingdom (UK) pharmaceutical company, Beecham.  Shortly after, it 
was introduced in the health care settings with the first case of methicillin-resistant 
Stapylococcus aureus emerging in less than two years (Jevons, 1961).  Subsequently, it quickly 
disseminated throughout many countries during the 1960s and early 1970s.  By the 1980s, these 
strains of MRSA became endemic, eventually leading to the worldwide pandemic.  
Evolution of MRSA 
Penicillin, a β-lactam antibiotic, covalently binds to and inhibits the synthesis, 
maintenance, and regulation of the peptidoglycan portion of the cell wall (Katayama et al., 
2000).  S .aureus strains have four normal penicillin binding proteins (PBP’s) anchored on the 
cytoplasmic membrane that participate in the crosslinking of the peptidoglycan to the bacterial 
cell wall.  These normal PBPs have a high affinity for β-lactam agents.  When bound to 
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penicillin, the PBPs are not able to function in the assembly of the cell wall, and cause bacterial 
death.  Resistance to penicillin results from the acquisition of a plasmid that encodes the 
penicillin-hydrolysing enzyme, penicillinase, a form of β-lactamase (Deurenberg et al., 2008).  
Methicillin was designed to resist β-lactamase degradation.  However, shortly after its 
introduction in clinical settings MRSA strains emerged that were resistant to all β-lactam 
antibiotics.  The primary mechanism by which S.aureus becomes resistant to methicillin is the 
acquisition of an acquired penicillin-binding protein, PBP2a, which is encoded by the mecA 
gene.  PBP2a has a low affinity for β-lactam antibiotics and is capable of substituting the 
biosynthetic functions of the normal PBPs even in the presence of B-lactams, thereby preventing 
cell lysis (Tomasz et al., 1989).  The mecA gene, which was first sequenced in 1987, is carried 
on a mobile genetic element, the staphylococcal cassette chromosome mec (SCCmec) (Song et 
al, 1987).  There are different combinations of mec gene complex classes.  To date, five types of 
SCCmec elements have been defined and labeled as SCCmec type I-V (Zhang, 2005).   
 S.aureus is polyclonal and carries a unique combination of hundreds of genes so that 
there is variation amongst genomes of different isolates of the organism.  14 fully annotated 
whole S.aureus genomes that have been sequenced reveal a huge diversity between the different 
strains, particularly in the lineage-determining surface protein genes and the mobile genetic 
elements (Lindsay and Holden, 2006).  These mobile genetic elements move in and out of S. 
aureus horizontally and often encode virulence and resistance genes (Lindsay and Holden, 
2006).  Remarkably, study of these whole genome sequences also revealed that strains belonging 
to the same lineage were strikingly similar despite the enormous differences in geography and 
time (Diep et.al, 2006). 
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Healthcare-associated vs Community-Acquired MRSA Strains 
Initially, MRSA strains were hospital-acquired and besides being resistant to all the 
lactams were also resistant to other classes of antibiotic including macrolides, tetracyclines, 
sulfonamides, and clindamycin.  These hospital-acquired MRSA possess SCCmec types I,II, or 
III. Starting in the mid1990s, MRSA strains have emerged in the community setting.  These new 
strains, termed Community-acquired MRSA (CA-MRSA), are usually resistant to β-lactams but, 
in contrast to hospital-acquired MRSA, are susceptible to other antimicrobial classes. 
Additionally, these strains have been found to carry mostly SCCmec type IV.   In the US, the 
pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) pattern USA300 is the most prevalent strain of the CA-
MRSA.  CA-MRSA strains are also more likely to possess unique combinations of virulence 
factors (Tenover et al., 2001; Moran et al., 2006).  Genetic analysis and comparison of historical 
MSSA strains, historical MRSA strains and CA-MRSA strains suggest evolution from a 
common ancestor (Robinson et al., 2005). 
The pathogenicity and virulence of S. aureus is associated with the capacity of this 
organism to produce several virulence factors including enterotoxins and serotypes A through Q 
(SEA-SEQ), toxic shock syndrome toxin-1 (TSST-1), cytolytic toxins, α and β hemolysins, 
exfoliative toxins, Panton-Valentine leukocidin (PVL), protein A, and several enzymes 
(Deurenberg, 2008). 
The difference between the two types of MRSA strains also has clinical importance.   
Healthcare-associated MRSA (HA-MRSA) infections often result from hospitalization of 
patients who become colonized while in the healthcare setting.  The most frequent types of 
MRSA infections encountered in healthcare settings are those associated with skin and soft 
tissue, surgery, use of indwelling devices, pneumonia, bacteremia, and sepsis.  Klevens et al. 
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(2007) found that 85% of severe invasive MRSA can be linked to HA-MRSA and the health care 
system.   Bacteremia and pneumonias accounted for 75.2% and 13.3% of these severe invasive 
infections, respectively.  
In contrast, in 2005, there were an estimated 14 million outpatient (i.e., physician offices, 
emergency and outpatient departments) healthcare visits for suspected S. aureus skin and soft 
tissue infections in the United States (Hersh et al., 2008).  The majority of these were due to CA-
MRSA.  Fridkin and colleagues (2005) found that 77% of CA-MRSA infections were skin and 
soft tissue infection, mainly skin abscesses and furunculosis, and a mere a 6% caused invasive 
disease.  These infections occur in patients who do not have the risk factors usually associated 
with HA-MRSA.  Yet, severe necrotizing pneumonia and shock resulting in death has also been 
caused by CA-MRSA strains (Hidron et al., 2009). 
MRSA Carriage 
Persons may be colonized with S. aureus before developing infections.  The main 
reservoir of S. aureus resides in the anterior nares.  Approximately 20% of individuals are 
persistently colonized, while 30% are intermittently colonized (Gorwitz et al., 2008).  Graham 
and colleagues performed a large population-based survey of S.aureus colonization in the US.  
They found that 28.6% of the population in their study had S. aureus in their nares.  5.2% of 
those individuals (1.5% of the total study population) had MRSA in their nares (Graham et al., 
2006).   Colonization provides a reservoir for the introduction when host defenses are breached.  
Individuals colonized with S. aureus are at an increased risk for subsequent infection (Huang et 
al., 2008).  Furthermore, direct contact between non-colonized individuals is common in both the 
community and healthcare setting.  Colonized individuals will most likely be infected by the 
strains that they already harbor. Moreover, Davis et al. demonstrated that individuals who are 
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colonized with MRSA are 10 times more likely to become infected with colonized strain than 
individuals who harbor MSSA (Davis et al., 2004).  Depending on the patient population, long-
term carriage rates in patients vary between 30% and 60% (Gorwitz et al., 2008).  
Reducing Risk of MRSA 
To reduce the risk of MRSA transmission is to eliminate the possibility of MRSA as a 
cause of any disease.  Conventional infection control strategies have been shown to help reduce 
MRSA transmission and infection.  These strategies include: hand hygiene programs with 
institutional education (Pittet et al, 2000); targeted screening of high-risk patients with resulting 
contact isolation and cohorting of patients cared for by staff that do not care for MRSA negative 
patients (Jernagan et al., 1996; Mutto et al., 2003); the use of barrier/universal precautions, such 
as disposable gowns, masks and gloves, with patients identified as MRSA carriers or MRSA-
infected (Huang et. al, 2006); and in some institutions decolonization of MRSA carriers 
(Buehlmann et al., 2008).  Often, combinations of these measures are performed collectively and 
are part of what is called a “MRSA bundle.”  In order to control the spread of MRSA infections 
and colonization, multiple simultaneous interventions likely need to be performed due to the 
multiple routes of transmission.  
Previous efforts to lower nosocomial infections by focusing on MRSA surveillance in 
high-risk units such as intensive care units have shown to be effective.  Huang et al. reported a 
67% reduction in bacteremias after this implementation (Huang et al., 2008).  Other investigators 
have also experienced a reduction in rate of MRSA infections (Clancy et al., 2006) while others 
did not achieve the same success (West et al., 2006; Harbarth et al, 2006; Holmes, 2010).  
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Molecular Procedures for Epidemiological Studies 
In the USA, PFGE is used by the CDC to assess the USA strain type and each is 
described by a similar PFGE pattern, antibiogram, mec type, and presence of absence of the PVL 
gene (Huang and Eells, 2011).  The healthcare-associated MRSA strains include USA100, 
USA200, and USA500.  The most common strain type of HA-MRSA is the USA100 strain. CA-
MRSA strains are classified as USA 300 and USA 400, with USA 300 being the most common 
(Tenover and Goering, 2009).  
More recently, other methods have been used for strain-typing.  These include MLST, 
protein A gene (spa) typing and gene chip-based techniques (Huang and Eells, 2011).  Each of 
the USA strain types has been found to have a corresponding MLST and spa type and rep-PCR 
pattern (Healy et al., 2005).  We have adopted an automated rep-PCR system for our strain 
comparisons.  Study of the genetic relatedness of isolates obtained during the course of an 
infection in a single patient is becoming a useful practice in many clinical and infection control 
laboratories.  The various techniques used try to determine whether isolates recovered from 
different patients or sources represent a single strain or multiple different strains.  Infection 
control practitioners use the information provided by molecular procedures to complement their 
epidemiological investigations.
   
 
CHAPTER II: REDUCING HOSPITAL ACQUIRED MRSA INFECTIONS 
“Search and Destroy” and Universal Screening 
Many hospitals outside the U.S. take part in the infection control practice of active 
surveillance of targeted high-risk patients (i.e. ICUs) screening to detect and manage the spread 
of MRSA by identifying asymptomatic carriers.  There are two approaches hospitals will take 
either “search and isolate” or “search and destroy” (Strasbaugh et al., 2006).  The latter strategy, 
coined by the Australians in the 1980’s (Dwyer and Perceval, 1982) but implemented by the 
Dutch, starts with culturing of all admitted patients for MSRA via a nasal swab of the nares. 
Those MRSA positive patients are isolated and treated to eradicate nasal carriage 
(Vandenbroucke-Grauls, 1996).  The typical decolonization regimen for MRSA includes topical 
application of 2% mupirocin twice a day to the colonized nares and chlorhexidine bathing, all for 
5-7 days (Hill et al., 1988).  The Netherlands, Iceland, and some Scandinavian countries have 
been able to maintain prevalence levels of nosocomial MRSA infections to <1%, presumably 
because of nationwide policies of “search and destroy” (van Trijp et al., 2007; Wertheim et al., 
2004; Kramer, 2010). 
This strategy has been slow to be accepted in the US, due to a lack of confidence that a 
pathogen-specific strategy would be cost-effective, or induce resistance to mupirocin, and reduce 
our ability to eradicate carriers with nasal application; however, where versions of “search and 
destroy” have been implemented, MRSA rates and prevalence have declined (Robicsek et al., 
2008; Parada, et al., 2009; Jain et al., 2011).  
 One 3-hospital health care organization deploying this method found that the MRSA 
disease rate decreased by >60% in 1 year (Peterson et al., 2007; Robicsek et al., 2008). 
Additionally, The Veterans Administration (VA) health care system of 153 hospitals performing 
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universal screening with contact isolation recorded a 77% reduction in the rate of MRSA disease 
for ICU patients after 21 months.  A 24% reduction rate of MRSA disease throughout the system 
for the patients who were not treated in the ICU was also observed within the first 21-months of 
implementation (Jain et al., 2011).  
Screening Employees 
It is traditionally thought that employees could either be victims of or the source of 
MRSA transmission (Bowler, 1997).  However, employees have been implicated as the source in 
a number of published outbreak reports.  Recently, an extensive literature review by Albrich and 
Harbarth revealed a role of employee carriers of MRSA in the transmission of MRSA.  They 
identified 79 studies that presented the role of employees in transmission of MRSA to patients 
and estimated the prevalence of MRSA in employees to be 4.6%, with rates ranging from 2%-
15% (Albrich and Harbarth, 2008).  Irrefutably, 27 studies had clear molecular and 
epidemiological associations which provided evidence of MRSA transmission from employees 
to patients, mostly in Europe.  Another 52 studies likely had the same presumed direction of 
transmission.  Interestingly, they found 18 studies with proven transmission to patients from 
employees not clinically infected with MRSA, and another 26 studies with likely transmission 
(Albrich and Harbarth, 2008).  Therefore, there is evidence that colonized employees could act 
as a reservoir for transmission and potentially cause hospital-acquired infections, (whether 
displaying symptoms or not).  
Most of the evidence for employee screening comes from outbreak reports where the 
outbreak was brought to an end following the introduction of staff screening as part as a number 
of infection control measures.  As part of the Dutch “search and destroy” program, it is 
mandatory that employees be screened routinely and may contribute to the low prevalence of 
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MRSA within the hospital systems.  There appears to be a widening pressure of a proposed 
screening program to include the screening of healthcare workers in other countries as well. 
“Search and Destroy” Strategy at Pitt County Memorial Hospital 
The numbers of clinical infections due to MRSA began to increase in the late 1990s across 
North Carolina hospitals, which led to a partnering of Infection Control Departments with that of 
Dr. Barry Farr of the University of Virginia, known as the Problem Pathogen Partnership (Muto 
et al., 2003).  Each of the participating hospitals, including PCMH, began to empirically culture 
admitted patients for nasal carriage of MRSA and rectal carriage of Vancomycin Resistant 
Enterococcus (VRE) and placed into Contact Precautions if they met special criteria that placed 
them at high risk for these resistant organisms.  This approach had been initiated at the 
University of Virginia hospitals and resulted in decreases of healthcare associated MRSA and 
VRE transmission (Calfee et al., 2003).  The categories of patients to be included were those 
transfers from Nursing Homes, patients on any form of dialysis, transfers from other healthcare 
facilities in which they had stayed > 4 days, and any patient with a prior MRSA or VRE positive 
culture.  PCMH added Home Health transfers to the listing.  This program was instituted first in 
the Surgical Intensive Care Unit, then incrementally to the other units in the hospital until all 
were included by early 2006.  In spite of that program, 52% of all S. aureus isolates at PCMH 
were MRSA.  While that percentage is not unusual for teaching hospitals, the following data 
were of concern: (a) MRSA accounted for 1-in-5 Surgical Site Infections among those patients 
undergoing surgery under the auspices of Medicare surveillance, the Surgical Infection 
Prevention Project, and up to 25% of the Surgical Site infections following Coronary Artery 
Bypass Surgery (b) Blood stream infections, or bacteremias due to MRSA exceeded those due to 
Methicillin-susceptible Staphylococcus aureus (MSSA) among patients admitted > 48hrs, 
 11 
 
suggesting healthcare acquisition of MRSA. Among device-related infections, MRSA accounted 
for 1-in-5 Ventilator-associated pneumonias (VAPs) in the surgical intensive care unit (SICU), 
and almost half of the VAPs and 22% of the central-line associated bacteremias in the Medical 
Intensive Care Unit (MICU).  Thus, despite the implementation of the most successful MRSA 
control methods used in the United States by 2006, plus quality control methods across the 
hospital, healthcare associated infections with MRSA were a challenge for PCMH (see Fig.1) 
 
 
Figure 1. MRSA VAP rates from January to December 2006. MRSA VAP rates for January 
2006 through December 2006. Rates are defined as the number of infections per number of 
devices days per 1000 days.  
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In response, the Quality Board at PCMH requested that the Medical Director of Infection 
Control meet and discuss methods to better control MRSA.  Various strategies were discussed, 
including screening of all patients admitted to the Intensive Care Units, screening of all patients 
scheduled for surgery, and screening of all admissions.  After careful consideration, the Quality 
Board of PCMH directed Dr. Ramsey to proceed with a version of the Dutch “Search and 
Destroy,” with the screening of all admitted patients to PCMH for MRSA (to include those 
patients undergoing elective surgery).  In contrast to the program of the Dutch, in which all 
employees work for the government, PCMH elected to offer voluntary screening of all 
employees for MRSA.  These programs were to begin in early 2007, after purchasing the 
necessary rapid testing methods for screening and detecting MRSA from nasal swabs, hiring 
additional staff, and the devising of educational and clinical processes to implement this large 
program.  Preliminary results detailing the impact of search and destroy with elective surgical 
procedures at PCMH has been reported by Pofahl and colleagues showing a reduction in surgical 
site infections, with statistical significant reduction among orthopedic procedures, comparing the 
pre-intervention infection rates to those of the post- “search and destroy” intervention (Pofahl et 
al., 2009).  
 
 
 CHAPTER III: METHODS AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Materials and Methods 
Study Design and Bacterial Isolates 
 Pitt County Memorial Hospital located in Greenville North Carolina, is an academic, 
tertiary care facility with more than 850 acute care beds.  The hospital offers all adult and 
pediatric medical and surgical services, including intensive care units.  
This study was a retrospective comparison of strain typing of clinical and employee 
isolates.  We obtained clinical MRSA from sputum, bronch lavages, tracheal aspirates, or blood 
after 48 hours of hospitalization beginning January 2006 through February 2011.  Employee 
isolates were obtained via nasal screening beginning January 2007 through Feb 2011.  
Active MRSA Surveillance Program 
Beginning in February 2007, all patients admitted to PCMH underwent a nasal swab for 
MRSA testing via PCR within 48 hours of admission.  Patients testing positive for MRSA were 
placed onto contact isolation and their physician notified.  The physicians would prescribe nasal 
mupirocin ointment BID to the nares X 5 days, and the nurses would use chlorhexidine soap for 
bathing (Pofahl, et al).  Infection control retained a portion of the prior screening program by 
repeating screening on a weekly basis for all MRSA-negative patients receiving antibiotics (Farr 
et al, 2001).  MRSA from either clinical isolates or screening were identified through growth on 
selective agar, and the results were usually reported within 48 hours.  All MRSA isolates were 
stored at -70° C in the hospital epidemiology laboratory.  In parallel, PCMH employees were 
given the option of voluntary nasal screening, confidentially, via nasal swab and the swabs were 
also plated onto selective agar for growth.  Those healthcare workers positive were not 
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furloughed from work, and were prescribed 5 days of mupirocin nasal ointment and 
chlorhexidine supplied for bathing as with the patients.  The employees were then re-swabbed 
for nasal carriage > 72hrs post completion of eradication therapy.  Data from the patients and 
employees were tabulated for percent positive. 
Healthcare Associated Infection Surveillance  
Healthcare associated infections were determined at PCMH via definitions from the 
Centers for Disease Control thru the National Health and Safety Network (NHSN) (Centers for 
Disease Control, 2005).  These include ventilator associated pneumonias (VAPs), central-line 
associated bloodstream infections (CLABSIs), and catheter-associated Urinary tract infections 
(CA-UTIs).  These infections are tabulated and converted to rates using the formula # infections/ 
# device days per 1000 device days to achieve rates comparable to other hospitals in the NHSN. 
These rates are determined each month, and tabulated longitudinally to determine trends in 
HAIs.  The Ventilator-associated pneumonias (VAPs), an extension of infection of MRSA in the 
respiratory tract from the nares, is the focus of the intervention and correlation of isolates 
between clinical samples from patients and the healthcare workers who have contact with them.  
Bacterial Culture and DNA extraction 
 Frozen isolates were cultured on agar with 5% sheep blood between 18 and 24 hrs at 
37°C.  This process was repeated two times. A 10µL loop full of bacteria was used in the DNA 
extraction using the UltraClean™ Microbial DNA Isolation Kit (Mo Bio Laboratories, Solana 
Beach, CA) according to manufacturer's instructions.  The presence and concentration of 
genomic DNA was estimated with NanoDrop® ND-1000 Spectrophotometer (Isogen, Ijssel 
stein, The Netherlands) and DNA concentration was adjusted to ~35 ng/µl for each sample.  
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Automated rep-PCR DNA Fingerprinting 
All DNA samples were amplified using the DiversiLab™ Staphylococcus kit for DNA 
fingerprinting (bioMérieux, Boxtel, The Netherlands) following the manufacturer's instructions. 
Briefly, 2 µl of genomic DNA (final concentration 35 ng/µl), 0.5 µl (or 2.5 U) of AmpliTaq® 
polymerase (Applied Biosystems, Foster City, CA, USA), 2 µl kit-supplied primer mix and 2.5 
µl of 10× PCR buffer (Applied Biosystems, Foster City, CA, USA) were added to 18 µl of the 
kit-supplied rep-PCR master mix (MM1) for a total of 25 µl per PCR mixture.  Thermal cycling 
parameters were as follows: initial denaturation at 94 °C for 2 min; followed by 35 cycles of 
denaturation at 94 °C for 30 sec, annealing at 45 °C for 30 s, extension at 70 °C for 90 s; and a 
final extension at 70 °C for 3 min.  
Separation and detection of rep-PCR products were done by micro-fluidic chips of the 
DiversiLab System (bioMérieux, Boxtel, The Netherlands) and analysis was performed with 
DiversiLab software version v.r.3.3.40.  The resulting DNA fingerprint patterns were viewed on 
a personal DiversiLab website as electropherograms.  The reports included a dendrogram with 
similarity matrix, scatterplot and a virtual gel image of the fingerprint for each sample. 
The DiversiLab software used the Pearson correlation coefficient to analyze and calculate 
genetic similarity coefficients among all samples.  The unweighted pair-group method of 
averages (UPGMA) was employed to automatically compare the rep-PCR profiles and create 
corresponding dendrograms (Healy et al., 2005).  Reports included computer-generated virtual 
gel images, scatterplots and selected demographic fields to aid interpretation of the data. 
Guidelines have been suggested by the manufacturer for determining the strain-level 
discrimination (subtyping).  Cluster analysis, based on peak height and presence or absence of 
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the peaks, was done by DiversiLab software.  Percentage similarity for S. aureus was set at 98% 
similarity. 
Statistical Analysis of Data 
Fisher’s exact test was used to see if there is evidence that the distributions of genotypes 
differ for clinical and employees and a Poisson regression of the data was carried out to see if 
there was a stastically significant change in the number of ventilator-associated pneumonias post 
implementation of universal screening. 
Research Objectives 
1. To determine the prevalence and genotypes of patient isolates upon admission. 
2. To determine the prevalence of nasal carriage among employees voluntarily screened. 
3. Correlate the incidence of nosocomial MRSA VAPs on the surgical intensive care unit 
with the nasal colonization of employees working on this unit during the year 2006. 
4. Determine the genotypes of MRSA clinical samples (VAP and bacteremias) from the 
SICU from January 2007 to February 2011. 
5. Determine the genotypes of employees colonized with MRSA working on the SICU 
from January 2007 to February 2011. 
6. Correlate potential route of transmission from employees to patients by molecular 
strain typing.
 CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 
Prevalence of Patients with MRSA on Admission and Prevalence of Employee MRSA 
Carriage 
On February 1, 2007, PCMH implemented a universal screening program. The first 8 months of 
admission screening data showed an approximate 8% (3129 out of 39,600) of MRSA nasal 
colonization among patients admitted to the hospital (Figure 2).  This rate has steadily remained 
constant for subsequent years and to the present.  In contrast, the employee MRSA nasal carriage 
was found to be 3.4% (Table 1). 
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Figure 2. Prevalence of MRSA Colonization or Infection at Admission.  Weekly rates of positive 
MRSA screens within an 8-month period following the implementation of universal screening at 
PCMH.  Trendline is shown in black. 
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*Total number includes duplicate employee samples obtained from different years 
 
Table 1. Total number of negative and positive employees tested for MRSA carriage from 2007 
through 2010 recovered from nasal swabs. 
Distribution of Admission Genotypes 
Genotypic analysis of the admission isolates for February, 2007, 2008, and 2009 showed 
that a majority of the samples were USA 100, the predominant strain causing HA-MRSA 
infections (Figure 3).  These USA 100 strains represent approximately 50% of all isolates that 
were tested during the three years.  However, between February 2007-2009, there was an 
increase in the percentage of USA 300 strains from 24% to 31%.   
 
 Healthcare Workers Tested  
%Positive # Negative #Positive Total # Tested 
2007 2442 107 2549 4.4 
2008 3031 79 3110 2.6 
2009 2420 69 2489 2.9 
2010 2286 89 2375 3.9 
Total 10,179* 344* 10523* 3.4 
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Figure 3. Genotypic analysis of the admission isolates for February 2007, 2008, and 2009. 
Percent distribution of USA types are given for subsequent years.  Genotypes are color-coded. 
Comparison of Genotypes between Employees MRSA Nasal Carriage and MRSA isolates 
from Ventilator-associated Pneumonias from the SICU 
 The availability of MRSA positive employee nasal screen isolates, allowed us to test a 
hypothesis to see if employee colonization could be responsible for the high rates of VAPs seen 
in the SICU. SICU employee isolates from 2007 were genotypically compared to the saved 
MRSA VAP isolates from 2006.   A total of 35 samples, 10 VAP clinical (sputum and bronchial 
lavages) samples and 25 employees, were tested.   Results showed 13 different rep-PCR patterns 
demonstrating strain diversity (Figure 5).  19-of-35 samples (54%) were described as USA 100, 
with representation from 5 different USA 100 strains.  This also describes strain diversity within 
a particular sub-type.  Five isolates were USA 300, five were USA 800, three were USA 200, 
and three were classified as “No Match”, meaning they are unique rep-PCR types by the 
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Diversilab system.  We found a correlation (identical banding of rep-PCR patterns) between 
clinical samples and employee samples (Cluster III and Cluster VIII).  There were also clusters 
of indistinguishable strain types within both groups of employees and clinical isolates.  
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Figure 4. Comparison of the diversity of ventilator-associated pneumonias isolates (blue squares) 
and employee isolates (green squares). Dendograms and virtual gel images showing the presence 
of 13 rep-PCR patterns. Clusters I-VIII include multiple isolates in each cluster which are 
indistinguishable. The bar at the bottom left indicates the present similarity coefficient with the 
strains. 
Genotypes of Clinical MRSA Infection isolates from the SICU 
Subsequent molecular typing of MRSA bacteremias was performed for comparison of 
strain types among other clinical specimens in the SICU, along with the original VAP sample 
set.  The results are shown below in Table 2 and Figure 5. Isolates from 36 patients revealed 31 
out of 36 clinical isolates were differentiated into four USA types.  Five isolates were classified 
as “No Match. There were 13 patterns observed among isolates.  Each pattern has groups of 
MRSA strains that are indistinguishable from one another, suggesting either common sources or 
localized spread.  USA 100 (50%) was the predominant strain, followed by USA 300 (25%). 
There were five different strains of USA 100 and three different strains of USA 300 which 
grouped accordingly in distinct patterns on the virtual gel-image as seen in Fig.1.  The remaining 
strains USA 200, USA 800 and No Matches accounted for 2.8%, 8.3% and 13.9%, respectively.  
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Table 2. Distribution and percentages of rep-PCR types found in clinical and employee samples.  
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Figure 5. Dendogram and virtual gel images of 36 clinical isolates (ventilator-associated pneumonias and 
bacteremias) obtained from the surgical intensive care unit from January 2006 until February 2011. 
Thirteen patterns (P1-P13) are represented by different colors located in Column “P”.  Patterns with 
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multiple isolates indicate indistinguishable strains. Sample ID, source, USA type, and collection date are 
located in between the dendogram and virtual gel images.  A similarity line of 98.5% is signified by a red 
dotted line.  The red diamond indicates a discordant sample.   
Genotypes of Employees MRSA Nasal Colonization from the SICU 
The genotyping data for fifty-five employee samples were collected from among 41 of 
the employees (Table 2 and Figure 6); thus, a minority of nine employees had different 
sequential isolates.  There was a considerable amount of strain diversity indicated by 21 different 
patterns. The isolates were characterized as being USA 100, USA 200, USA 300, or USA 800 
for 46 out of 55 employee samples. Nine isolates were considered “No Match”.  As in the case 
with the clinical isolates, approximately 50% of the isolates from among the employees were 
found to be USA 100, while the second prevalent genotype was USA 300 (approximately 18% ). 
USA 200, USA 800, and “No Matches” resulted in 3.6%, 14.5%, 16.4%, respectively of the 
remaining isolate strain types. 
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Figure 6. Dendogram and virtual gel images demonstrating the diversity of MRSA strains among 
employees in the surgical intensive care unit from January 2007 until February 2011.  Twenty-one 
patterns (P1-P21), indicated by different colors in “Column P”, were observed. Patterns with 
multiple isolates indicate indistinguishable strains. Sample ID, source, USA type, and collection date are 
located in between the dendogram and virtual gel images.  A similarity line of 98.7% is signified by a red 
dotted line.  The red diamonds indicate discordant samples.   
Comparison of Genotypes between Clinical MRSA Isolates and Employees with Positive 
MRSA Nasal Screens 
The comparison of fingerprints between the isolates of employees and clinical samples 
revealed that 10-of-34 patterns were shared between the two groups (Figure 7).  This indicates a 
correlation between employee carriage and the possibility of transmission to patients and 
subsequent clinical infection.  Since some healthcare workers have had the same strain type for a 
number of years, these strains likely represent endemic strains that are circulating in the surgical 
intensive care unit. 
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Figure 7. Dendogram and virtual gel images of 27 clinical isolates and 29 employee isolates. 
With the exception of Pattern 4 (employee samples only), clinical and employee samples share 
indistinguishable strains among a variety of patterns. Sample ID, source, USA type, and 
collection date are located in between the dendogram and virtual gel images.  A similarity line of 
98.2% is signified by a red dotted line. The red diamonds indicate discordant samples. 
Impact of “Search and Destroy” on Ventilator-associated Pneumonias 
 After universal screening of patients and voluntary screening of employees, plus 
eradication therapy for those positive began in February 2007, there was a statistically significant 
decline in the amount of VAPs due to MRSA on the SICU (Figure 8).  This indicates that 
screening and eradication of MRSA carriage among patients upon admission, plus screening and 
eradication of MRSA among HCWs decreases the chance of clinical infection among the MRSA 
nasal screen negative patients. 
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Figure 8. Quarterly rates of MRSA ventilator-associated pneumonia between the years 2006-
2010. Downward trend for ventilator-associated pneumonia was significant (P=0.0002, with the 
use of Poisson regression). 
 CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION 
Study Conclusions 
Despite the implementation of the most successful MRSA control methods used in the 
United States by 2006, plus quality control methods across the hospital, healthcare associated 
infections with MRSA were a challenge for PCMH, particularly ventilator associated infections. 
On February 1, 2007, PCMH initiated a universal admission screening or surveillance 
program for MRSA, making it one of the four institutions or hospital systems in the United 
States to screen all inpatient hospital admissions for MRSA (Robicsek et al., 2008; Parada et al., 
2009; Javin et al., 2011).  Whereas the other participating organizations have adopted a version 
of this strategy, the University Health System (UHS) Quality Board adopted a novel version of 
this “search and destroy” strategy by offering voluntary screening and eradicating of nasal 
carriage of MRSA among employees.  This is the first hospital in the United States to employ or 
implement this part of the program.  The initial six months of admission screening revealed the 
prevalence of patients admitted to the hospital carrying MRSA was approximately 8%, with 
approximately 3390-of-42,375 of patients testing positive upon admittance to the hospital the 
first year.  This prevalence rate is higher than the 6.3% admission rate found at Northwestern 
among 40,000 annual admissions in a 3-hospital organization (Robicsek, et al., 2008); however, 
the percent MRSA positive upon admission is lower than the percentages seen for the VA-
hospital system with an admission colonization rate of 13.6% (Javin et al., 2011).  The latter 
differences are perhaps due to differences in age, and severity of illness, but most likely a result 
of the male predominance of the patients served by the VA medical system.  
In contrast, employees at PCMH had a 3.4% positive nasal carriage rate for MRSA, or 
about half the rate in the patients whom they serve.  Potential explanations for the lower 
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percentage could include the younger age, better health, and better hygiene practices of 
employees.  Unfortunately, few studies in the US have examined employee carriage other than in 
response to MRSA outbreaks among hospitalized patients, where there is suspicion of carriage 
and transmission to hospitalized patients.  
In one of the few published studies of nasal colonization of employees, screening of 200 
healthcare-workers at Johns Hopkins University Medical Center revealed a 2% carriage rate 
among medical and nursing staff (Milestone et al., 2010).  On the other hand, the percentage of 
nares colonization of employees at PCMH is substantially lower than the 12% carriage rate 
among 33 employees from Driscoll Children’s Hospital, Corpus Christi, Texas (Stein et 
al.,2006).  
Genotypic analysis of the admission isolates for February, 2007, 2008, and 2009 showed 
that a majority of the samples were USA 100 and there was an increase in the percentage of USA 
300 strains from 24% to 31%.  This is consistent with the results of other investigators (Gorwitz 
et al., 2008; Tenover et al., 2009), reflecting the growing importance of USA 300, or 
community-CA-MRSA.  The genotypic analysis of the clinical samples and those from 
employees from PCMH’s SICU also revealed USA 100 as the predominant strain, suggesting 
this strain has circulated among patients both in the community and hospital.  There appears to 
be a higher incidence of USA 300 emerging in the clinical specimens and employee screens 
among the SICU in parallel.  A population-based study of invasive MRSA infections in the 
United States from 2005 to 2006 revealed that USA 100 and USA 300 are the predominant 
MRSA PFGE types (Limbago et al.2009; Klevens et al., 2007), which parallels to the 
observations in Table 2, Figure 5, and Figure 6.  In contrast, in the Johns Hopkins study which is 
the only published work in the US exploring molecular typing of MRSA strains colonizing 
 34 
 
hospital employees, none of the 8 isolates were characterized as CA-MRSA (Milestone et al., 
2010).  
Along with the large numbers of patients and employee screening for MRSA, another 
novel feature of our study is the correlation of the genotypes of employee MRSA strains with 
those of patients with nosocomial infection using rep-PCR for strain-typing.  The absence of any 
significant differences between the distributions of genotypes among the patients and employees 
(p-value = 0.1924 for the Fisher’s Exact Test and and p < 0.05) further suggests that the 
predominant clones of USA 100 and  300 have been circulating among both our patients and 
employees during, if not before, this study period. 
Implementation of universal screening of the nares with subsequent eradication therapy 
was successful in reducing healthcare-associated lower-respiratory tract infections with a 
decrease from 2.1157 of MRSA cases 0.4797 MRSA cases/1000 device days.  The rate after the 
intervention is 22.7% of the rate before the intervention. Poisson regression of the data indicated 
the ratio of the rates (0.227) is significantly different from 1.  The p-value was 0.0002, so we 
conclude that this ratio is significantly different from 1 (p-value=0.0002, 95% CI: 0.105 to 
0.490).  These decreases in clinical infections defined as pneumonias were also observed by 
colleagues  in  the VA hospital system (Jain et al, 2011), suggesting the validity of our approach 
at PCMH; however in the VA study, no attempt was made to separate non-ventilator and 
ventilator-associated pneumonias.  The MRSA universal screening program at Northwestern also 
demonstrated a significant decrease in respiratory tract cultures and infections caused by MRSA 
(Robicsek et al., 2008), but like the VA Study, did not differentiate between types of respiratory 
tract infections. 
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Overall, there was a great diversity of strain types found in our institution among both 
employees and clinical isolates.  The existence of genetically indistinguishable strains in both 
groups supports the idea that employee carriage of MRSA potentially plays a role in clinical 
infections such as ventilator-associated pneumonias.  These data support the role of a screening 
program for MRSA carriage among employees with subsequent decolonization for the 
prevention of nosocomial MRSA infections.  
Notably, there was implementation of general infection control practices throughout the 
sample collection.  Therefore, with multiple control procedures being performed simultaneously, 
the exact contribution of the specific surveillance and eradication program is uncertain.  Since 
our study was conducted at a single organization, our findings cannot be generalized to other 
institutions.  Secondly, as we have not performed systematic testing for mupirocin resistance 
among our isolates due to the absence of non-standardized susceptibility testing, we are not 
aware of any changes or loss of mupirocin resistance among our populations of treated carriers. 
Since our study was conducted at a single organization, our findings may not be generalized for 
other institutions.  However, our experience suggests that a multiplicity of measures including 
employee screening and universal testing of admission for MRSA colonization needs to be in 
place to account for the multiple potential sources and routes of transmission and to control the 
spread of MRSA colonization and infection.
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APPENDIX: IRB APPROVALS 
This research has been approved by the Institutional Review Board under the usage of two 
separate IRB applications. "Retrospective and Ongoing Analysis of MRSA at PCMH" (IRB # 
09-0543) approves the use of data from among patients at PCMH, and "Retrospective and 
Ongoing Analysis of Health Care Workers with MRSA" (IRB# 09-0020) approves the use of 
data from among employees, or staff with MRSA at PCMH. 
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